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NARROW CONSTRUCTION OF
COMMENCEMENT OF DRILLING CLAUSE:
KUYKENDALL v. HELMERICH & PA YNE
I. INTRODUCTION
Courts have generally held that commencement of drilling opera-
tions clauses' in oil and gas leases can be satisfied by something less
than the actual spudding of the earth with a drill bit. Many courts have
held that adequate preparation 2 with the intent to drill3 will extend a
1. Some courts have made a distinction between commencement of drilling and commence-
ment of drilling operations clauses. But see Fast v. Whitney, 26 Wyo. 433, -, 187 P. 192, 195
(1920) (concluding that there is no reasonable distinction between the two clauses).
2. The following cases illustrate circumstances which have been construed to be adequate
commencement of drilling: Stolz, Wagner & Brown v. Duncan, 417 F. Supp. 552, 562 (W.D.
Okla. 1976) (a diligent and reasonable effort to locate a drilling rig along with ground work prepa-
ration); Champlin v. Sinclair Oil & Gas Co., 344 P.2d 268, 271 (Okla. 1959) (lessee is not required
to have actual production by the commencement date); Burgess v. Oklahoma Gas Util. Co., 171
Okla. 294, 295, 42 P.2d 240, 240 (1935) (moving materials and erecting a derrick); Aldridge v.
Gypsy Oil Co., 132 Okla. 13, 14, 268 P. 1109, 1109-10 (1928) (good faith preparation for drilling);
Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla. 135, 136, 265 P. 647, 647 (1928) (drilling the water well to
supply water for drilling oil well); Cromwell v. Lewis, 98 Okla. 53, 54, 223 P. 671, 672 (1923)
(digging the cellar and moving timbers to the site); Gonzales v. Cowerd, 78 Okla. 84, 84, 188 P.
1053, 1054 (1920) (moving lumber and erecting a derrick on the drill site).
For a list of cases outside Oklahoma see 2 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 349
(rev. perm. ed. 1959). See also Crye v. Giles, 200 So. 155, 156 (La. Ct. App. 1941) (lessee erected a
derrick and dug the slush pit); Robinson v. Gordon Oil Co., 258 Mich. 643, -, 242 N.W. 795, 796
(1932) (lessee dug a slush pit and erected a derrick); Henderson v. Ferrell, 183 Pa. 547, -, 38 A.
1018, 1018 (1898) (staking the drill site and delivering timbers); Texas Co. v. Curry, 229 S.W. 643,
644 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (erecting a derrick on the drill site); Cockrum v. Christy, 223 S.W. 308,
309 (Tex. Civ. App. 1920); McCallister v. Texas Co., 223 S.W. 859, 861 (rex. Civ. App. 1920)
(hauling derrick timbers to site and providing water supply for drilling); Guleke v. Humble Oil &
Ref. Co., 126 S.W.2d 38,41 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) (lessee moved materials for erecting a derrick
and drilling a water well to the drill site); Edgar v. Bost, 14 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929)
(erecting a derrick on the drill site); Fleming Oil & Gas Co. v. South Penn Oil Co., 37 W. Va. 645,
-, 17 S.E. 203, 206 (1893) (moving timbers to drill site and erecting a derrick); Fast v. Whitney,
26 Wyo. 443, -, 187 P. 192, 199 (1920) (moving a derrick to the drill site).
3. It is not enough that the lessee has commenced some form of preparation for drilling; he
must have done so with the good faith intention of completing the drilling. The general rule is
followed in Oklahoma caselaw:
An agreement between the lessor and lessee that the lessee "shall commence to drill
a well within the terms of this lease" is complied with where the lessee, or his assign, has,
in goodfaith, made the location for the well, moved the machinery upon the premises,
erected a derrick and drilled a water well to supply water for the drilling operations
before the date of the expiration of the lease, if he, in goodfaith, continues to prosecute
drilling operations and completes the well with diligence and dispatch, although the ac-
tual drilling of the well does not begin until after the date fixed for the expiration of the
lease.
Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla. 135, 135, 265 P. 647, 647 (1928) (emphasis added).
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lease even when the primary term would otherwise have expired.4
Courts have also held that the commencement of drilling operations
anywhere on a pooled acreage can satisfy the drilling clauses for all the
leases in the unit.5 In a recent decision, Kuykendall v. Helmerich &
Payne,6 the Oklahoma Appellate Court held that the mere filing of an
application to extend an existing spacing unit to include leased prop-
erty is not sufficient to extend the primary term of that lease, even
though drilling is commenced on adjacent land that is eventually
pooled with the leased property.
Oil and gas leases are generally strictly construed against the
lessee,7 however, commencement of drilling operations clauses are lib-
erally construed to effectuate the intent of the parties and to promote
development.8 The Kuykendall decision involved a conflict between
these two principles of construction. This Note will focus on this con-
flict while discussing and evaluating the major theories presented by
the defendant, Helmerich & Payne.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Kuykendalls owned an undivided one-half interest in the
minerals underlying a tract of land in Grady County, Oklahoma. On
December 20, 1971, Kuykendall executed an oil and gas lease to Taft
Milford for a primary term of five years. The lease could be extended
4. The primary term is the period during which the lessee may keep the lease alive even
though there has been no attempt at production; typically the primary term is five or ten years.
The lease will normally provide for a secondary term that will keep the lease alive past the pri-
mary term and for as long as oil or gas are found in paying quanties. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 570-71 (1982).
5. See Kunc v. Harper-Turner Oil Co., 297 P.2d 371, 375 (Okla. 1956); Trawick v. Castle-
berry, 275 P.2d 292, 294 (Okla. 1953); McClain v. Harper, 206 Okla. 437, 439, 244 P.2d 301, 303
(1952).
An Oklahoma statute provides that commencement of drilling on pooled acreage will satisfy
commencement of drilling operations clauses in all the leases within the unit:
Operations carried on under and in accordance with the plan of unitization shall be
regarded and considered as a fulfillment of and compliance with all of the provisions,
covenants, and conditions, expressed or implied, of the several oil and gas mining leases
upon lands included within the unit area, or other contracts pertaining to the develop-
ment thereof, insofar as said leases or other contracts may relate to the common source
of supply or portion thereof included in the unit area. Wells drilled or operated on any
part of the unit area no matter where located shall for all purposes be regarded as wells
drilled on each separately-owned tract within such unit area.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1981).
6. 54 OKLA. B.J. 26 (Jan. 8, 1983).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 37-55.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 51-55.
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indefinitely if drilling was commenced before the expiration date.9
On November 12, 1976, Helmerich & Payne, apparently anticipat-
ing the acquisition of the Kuykendall lease from Milford, filed an ap-
plication with the Oklahoma Corporation Commission requesting that
its well spacing unit,' 0 already covering adjacent property, be enlarged
to include the Kuykendall acreage."I On November 17, approximately
one month before the primary term was to expire, Milford assigned his
lease to Helmerich & Payne. Helmerich & Payne commenced drilling
a well (McClure No. 1) on December 3, on acreage ajoining the Kuy-
kendall tract. On December 9 the trial examiner recommended that
the Corporation Commission approve the spacing extention.'2 On De-
cember 21, one day after the primary term of the Kuykendall lease
expired, the Corporation Commission followed the trial examiner's rec-
ommendation and issued an order extending Helmerich & Payne's 640
acre spacing unit to include the Kuykendall acreage.' 3 On March 30,
1977, Helmerich & Payne asked the Commission to issue a nunc pro
tunc 14 order that would make the Commission's December 21st pooling
order effective December 9, 1976, thus preventing the expiration of the
lease.' 5 The nunc pro tunc order was approved and issued on May 4,
1977. Kuykendall, however, appealed the order to the Oklahoma
Court of Appeals which declared the order null and void on April 17,
1979.16
After the court of appeals voided the nunc pro tunc order, Kuy-
kendall made a demand on Helmerich & Payne to release the lease.
Helmerich & Payne refused and filed a quiet title action which was
later dismissed.' 7 Kuykendall then filed an action in the district court
against Helmerich & Payne seeking to (1) quiet his mineral interest
title; (2) force an accounting for his share of the unit well production;
(3) recover damages resulting from Helmerich & Payne's willful failure
9. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 26-27. While C.H. and G.G. Kuykendall jointly executed the lease to
Taft Milford, hereinafter Kuykendall will appear in the masculine-singular.
10. Well spacing regulates the number and location of wells over a given reservoir, reducing
the waste caused by drilling more wells than are necessary to drain the reservoir. For a complete
review of well spacing regulations in Oklahoma see OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (1981).
11. 54 OKLA. BJ. at 26.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Nunc pro tunc is "[a] phrase applied to acts allowed to be done after the time when they
should be done, with a retroactive effect, ie., with the same effect as if regularly done." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 964 (5th ed. 1979).
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to release the lease; and (4) recover punitive damages.' Helmerich &
Payne filed an answer claiming that its failure to release the lease was
in good faith. In addition, Helmerich & Payne cross-petitioned for a
judgment that, due to the completion of McClure No. 1, the original
lease had been extended beyond the primary term.' 9 The trial court
found in favor of Helmerich & Payne, finding that a well had been
commenced within the terms of the lease.2" Kuykendall appealed the
decision and the Oklahoma Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the
primary term was not extended, and remanded the case to determine
Kuykendall's damages.2' Justice Bacon dissented, noting the "gross
imbalance of equities" against Helmerich & Payne.22
III. OIL AND GAS LAW PRIOR TO KUYKENDA1LL
A. Evolution of the Commencement Clause
A commencement of drilling clause is incorporated in an oil and
gas lease to assure the lessor that the land will be developed.23 The
clause was originally used because oil was thought to flow like water
under the ground24 and haste was required in developing a mineral
interest, since the oil would otherwise escape. Although this migratory
conceptualization of oil and gas finds few adherents today,25 it had a
substantial influence on the evolution of early oil and gas law.26 Today
commencement of drilling clauses are designed to protect the alienabil-
18. Id
19. Id
20. Id at 27.
21. Id at 29.
22. Id
23. A commencement of drilling lease is "[a] lease under the terms of which the commence-
ment of a well during the primary term will suffice to keep such lease alive into the secondary term
while such drilling operations are prosecuted with reasonable diligence." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 4, at 109-10.
24. See W. SUMMERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 103 (1927) (oil and gas
was thought to be capable of migration to other tracts without interference); see also Hardwicke,
The Rule of Capture andlts Implications as Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEx. L. Rnv. 391 (1935) (oil
was thought to be more like animals than minerals in that it had the power and tendency to
escape) Id at 395 (quoting Westmoreland Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, -, 18 A. 724,
725 (1889)).
25. See Moses, What Constitutes Commencement of Operations Under an Oil, Gas and Mineral
Lease, 16 TUL. L. REV. 572, 573-74 (1942).
26. Much of oil and gas law is based on the principle that oil and gas are migratory. The
laws were drafted to protect the lessor since he had a great deal to lose if the land was not properly
developed; all of his oil could escape to an adjoining tract. For further discussion of the migratory
nature of oil and its influence on current law see Moses, supra note 25, at 573-75; W. SUMMERS,
supra note 24, § 103. But cf. Hardwicke, supra note 24, at 393-95 (defending the common law
theory of oil and gas law as logical and necessary).
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ity of land and provide a faster return of royalties to the lessor. A com-
mencement clause also protects land from drainage by neighboring
wells.
B. Pooling and Unitization
Traditionally, the commencement of drilling clause has been satis-
fied when drilling was commenced on pooled acreage.27 Pooling is the
joining of small tracts of land to form a common drilling unit under
applicable spacing rules.28 Pooling serves two purposes: it prevents
physical and economic waste associated with the drilling of unneces-
sary wells, 29 and it protects the landowner from losses due to drain-
age.30 Unitization refers to the banding together of landowners for the
joint operation of an entire oil and gas reservoir.3' The purpose of uni-
tization is to obtain oil and gas from the reservoir without regard to
individual drilling units or boundary lines. The benefits derived from
unitization depend on the stage of production. Before the development
of a reservoir, unitization allows the strategic placement of wells for
maximum efficiency. During primary production, 2 unitization facili-
tates the use of pressure maintenance 33 and gas cycling 34 techniques.
When the primary production methods gradually fail to produce oil in
paying quantities, 35 unitization is necessary before secondary recovery
techniques36 can be used.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE KuYKENDALL DECISION
The Oklahoma Court of Appeals held that Helmerich & Payne's
commencement of a well on an adjacent spacing unit, along with the
27. See supra note 5.
28. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 554-55.
29. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
30. Drainage is the loss of oil or gas to other mineral interest owners operating adjacent
wells. See 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 202-03.
31. See id at 800-01.
32. Primary production is "[p]roduction from a reservoir by primary sources of energy, that
is, from natural energy in the reservoir when it is in an early stage of production, with little loss of
pressure and with most wells still flowing." Id at 569-70.
33. Pressure maintenance is instituted when water, gas or other fluids are pumped into the
reservoir in order to maintain pressure. See id at 567.
34. Gas cycling is a method used to maintain pressure in the reservoir by returning com-
pressed residue gas to the well. See id at 163-64.
35. The well will eventually reach a point where it costs more to pump the remaining oil to
the surface than the oil is worth. See id at 580-81.
36. There are numerous types of secondary recovery methods, one example being the injec-
tion of water into one end of the reservoir in order to force the remaining oil out of the wells at the
other end. See id at 681-82.
1983]
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pending application to extend the spacing unit, did not constitute a
commencement of drilling for the purpose of extending the Kuykendall
lease. According to the court, on December 20, 1976, the date the pri-
mary term of the Kuykendall lease was to expire, the spacing applica-
tion was merely pending, therefore the Kuykendall land was not
technically pooled within the terms of the lease.
A. Judicial Construction of Oil and Gas Leases
The drilling clause in the Kuykendall lease provided that "If the
lessee shall commence to drill a well. . . on acreage pooled therewith,
the lessee shall have the right to drill such well to completion. .... -37
Referring to the drilling clause, the appellate court held that when lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous, there is nothing to construe;38 and
since Helmerich & Payne did not commence a well on "acreage pooled
therewith," the lease should not have been extended. Contrary to the
court's opinion, it is arguable that the term "commencement" is ambig-
uous, requiring judicial interpretation. For a court to hold that "com-
mencement" is clearly defined, is to contradict a long line of cases that
have stated otherwise.4°
The court further implied that even if the drilling clause was am-
biguous, Helmerich & Payne should not have prevailed because oil and
gas leases should be strictly construed against the lessee.4' Construing
oil and gas leases against the lessee is a long-standing practice dating
back to the time when oil was thought to flow beneath the earth like a
river.42 The rule originated in part because courts were concerned that
following the normal rule of contracts, which generally construes leases
against the lessor, would allow the lessee to delay while the oil escaped
to an adjoining tract.43 Although the practice of construing an oil and
37. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27.
38. Id (citing Dilworth v. Fortier, 405 P.2d 38, 50 (Okla. 1964). If the contract clearly shows
the intentions of the parties then there is no need to apply technical rules of construction. If the
intent of the parties is unambiguous then it must be carried out even though the results may be
harsh.).
39. Id
40. See, e.g., Smith v. Gypsy Oil Co., 130 Okla. 135, 136, 265 P. 647, 648 (1928) (a proper
disposition as to whether the erection of an oil derrick constitutes commencement of drilling nec-
essarily involves a construction of the commencement clause in the lease).
41. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27 (citing Beatty v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 688, 258 P.2d 626, 628 (1953)),
42. Oil and gas "are supposed to percolate restlessly about under the surface of the earth,
even as the birds fly from field to field and the beasts roam from forest to forest. ... Medina
Oil Dev. Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333, 335 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
43. See Superior Oil & Gas Co. v. Mehlin, 25 Okla. 809, 817, 108 P. 545, 548 (1910).
[Vol. 19:271
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gas lease against a lessee is still good law,' it is usually not the single
rule of construction upon which courts rely. Other factors influencing
the construction of a lease include the lessor's potential losses due to
drainage, the effect such a construction will have on promoting devel-
opment, and the good faith intentions and expectations of the parties to
the lease.
1. Drainage
Some courts justify the construction of an oil and gas lease against
a lessee for the practical reason that it is generally the lessee that solicits
and drafts the lease and therefore it should be the drafting-lessee that
bears the burden of ambiguity due to poor drafting.45 The majority of
Oklahoma courts, however, state that the primary reason for such a
construction is to prevent drainage.46 Drainage is the migration of oil
or gas toward a producing well located on adjacent lands. Drainage is
caused by the reduction in pressure that occurs when wells are bot-
tomed in the reservoir.' The Kuykendall court cited Beatty v. Baxter"
as authority for a strict interpretation against the lessee. Beatty held
that the construction of an oil and gas lease "is governed by different
rules of construction from those applicable to other contracts, being
construed most strongly against the lessee and in favor of the lessor.
The reason therefor [sic] springsfrom the danger of loss of oil and gas by
drainage. ,49
Drainage is usually a legitimate concern when construing a com-
mencement of drilling clause. To conclude that the lease in Kuykendall
should have been strictly construed against Helmerich & Payne be-
cause of possible loss through drainage is not logical, however, since
Kuykendall was under no threat of losing oil and gas to other mineral
interest owners operating adjacent wells, and the one day delay in ob-
taining the spacing order had no effect whatsoever on the completion
44. "An oil and gas lease is governed by different rules of construction from those applicable
to other contracts, being construed most strongly against the lessee and in favor of the lessor."
Simon v. Foster, 373 P.2d 28, 30 (Okla. 1962).
45. See Prowant v. Sealy, 77 Okla. 244, 252, 187 P. 235, 243 (1920) (construction based on
fact that lessee prepared the lease).
46. See, e.g., Beatty v. Baxter, 208 Okla. 686, 688, 258 P.2d 626, 628 (1953); Frank Oil Co. v.
Belleview Gas & Oil Co., 29 Okla. 719, 732, 119 P. 260, 265 (1911); Superior Oil & Gas Co. v.
Mehlin, 25 Okla. 809, 817, 108 P. 545, 548 (1910).
47. See 8 H. WILLIAMaS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 202-03.
48. 208 Okla. 686, 258 P.2d 626 (1953).
49. Id at 688, 258 P.2d at 628 (emphasis added).
1983]
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date of McClure No. 1.50
2. Promoting Development
Many states have recognized that a mechanical construction of oil
and gas leases against the lessee could have an adverse effect on pro-
moting development."1 The rule of construction has therefore been
limited to cases where it promotes the development intended by the
parties. Thus, in Simons v. McDaniel12 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
stated:
Frequently this court has construed oil and gas mining leases
strictissimi juris as against the lessee and liberally in favor of
[the] lessor. But this has always been to the end ofpromoting
development as contemplated by the parties.
Herein the lessee has, by his actions, evidenced a desire
to develop, and no court has been more favorable to the inter-
ests of a lessee who seeks to perform his covenants. 53
One could argue that construing the lease against Helmerich &
Payne hindered, rather than promoted development. Lessees in Hel-
merich & Payne's position, who have evidenced a desire to develop the
land by actually drilling on an existing spacing unit and making timely
application to extend the existing unit to include a leased acreage, are
powerless to pursue such development without final approval being is-
sued by the Corporation Commission. Helmerich & Payne was forced
to recognize Kuykendall's operating interest in the well, though Kuy-
kendall did not share in its expense.54 Had Helmerich & Payne real-
ized the disproportionate risks it faced in attempting to develop the
Kuykendall lease by extending its existing unit, it might have aban-
doned the attempt, thus causing further delays in the development of
50. Leases are to be strictly applied against the lessee to prevent delays in drilling that cause
loss of oil and gas through drainage to neighboring wells. Helmerich & Payne commenced drill-
ing (McClure No. 1) on December 3, 1976, and completed the well on May 23, 1977. 54 OKLA.
B.J. at 26. None of the delay could be attributed to the Corporation Commission's consideration
and approval of the spacing application. Id at 28.
51. Williams states, "The policy of strict construction in favor of the lessor may be reason-
able where designed to encourage development of the premises, but this policy should not be
followed in situations where development will be discouraged." 3 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS
LAW § 628, at 376-77 (1980).
52. 154 Okla. 168, 7 P.2d 419 (1932).
53. Id at 171, 7 P.2d at 421 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
54. Helmerich & Payne pointed out that had it known the lease was going to terminate, it
could have entered into an agreement with Kuykendall to share in the risks involved with drilling
McClure No. 1. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 28.
[Vol. 19:271
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the Kuykendall acreage. It is important to note that at the time Hel-
merich & Payne filed the application with the Corporation Commis-
sion, Kuykendall was probably delighted at the prospect of obtaining a
royalty interest in McClure No. 1.55
The court implied that Helmerich & Payne could have preserved
its lease by drilling directly on the Kuykendall land. According to the
court, "The location of the well was merely approved by the commis-
sion. No law, rule or regulation prevented Helmerich & Payne from
seeking permission to drill on the Kuykendall land instead of someone
else's in Section 72"56 While this may be true, the best location for a
well in terms of development had already been determined by the Cor-
poration Commission. It is questionable whether forcing Helmerich &
Payne to drill directly on the Kuykendall land would have promoted
the efficient development of the reservoir.57
3. Good Faith
The good faith intention to complete the development of a well is
an important implied condition of any lease containing a commence-
ment clause.5" The Kuykendal court overlooked this condition when it
relied on Graves v. Nichlos,5 9 a case that strictly construed a "pay rent
or commence drilling" clause.60 In that case, Graves leased property to
Nichlos with the restriction that until a well was commenced, Nichlos
would pay fifty dollars a month. Nichlos did not drill a test well and
ceased paying the rent after nine months. 6' The court ruled that
Nichlos must pay the fifty dollars a month for the term of the lease,
which was determined to be one year. The lease was construed against
the lessee because it was evident that Nichlos had made no attempt and
had no intention of commencing an oil well.62 The results were equita-
ble because Nichlos was forced to pay rent for the remainder of the
term, which was plainly the intention of the parties when the lease was
executed. Kuykendall should be distinquished from Graves because
Helmerich & Payne did act with the good faith intention of complying
55. Id
56. Id The court's opinion stated that Kuykendall was to receive a 3/16 royalty interest. Id.
at 26.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 110-12.
58. See supra note 3.
59. 151 Okla. 27, 1 P.2d 708 (1931).
60. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27.
61. 151 Okla. at 28, 1 P.2d at 709.
62. Id at 29, 1 P.2d at 710.
1983]
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with the terms of the lease, as evidenced by its commencement and
eventual completion of McClure No. 1 with a view toward pooling that
well with the Kuykendall interest.
The Kuykendall court also contended that holding in favor of Hel-
merich & Payne would expose lessors to a large number of potential
abuses. The court speculated that "[a]n ingenious lessee could always
think of some application to file with the corporation commission in an
effort to 'toll,' as it were, the running of a lease term. 63 The court's
presumption ignores the long standing requirement that for an applica-
tion to effectively toll the expiration of the lease, it must be filed in
good faith.' The lessee must have both the good faith intent of pro-
moting the development intended by the parties and the good faith be-
lief that the application will be approved. Merely filing an application
with the Corporation Commission to toll the running of a lease would
be an act of bad faith and the lessee would thereby fail to satisfy the
terms of the lease.
B. Helmerich & Payne's Contentions
1. Relation Back
The doctrine of relation back is a legal fiction whereby an act per-
formed at one time is considered to have been done at some antecedent
period.65 Helmerich & Payne asked the court to apply the relation
back doctrine and make the spacing order effective as of November 12,
1976, the day the application was filed.66 If the order extending the
spacing unit was effective on the day it was filed then a well, viz. Mc-
Clure No. 1, was commenced on acreage pooled with Kuykendall's
land, the lease requirements were met, and the lease should have been
extended beyond the primary term and Helmerich & Payne's interest
continued. There are no cases, however, that have applied the relation
back doctrine to situations involving the pendency of a spacing applica-
tion, and the Kuykendall court expressly refused to establish a prece-
dent. The court held that "the legal fiction is justified by neither law,
logic nor fairness. 67
63. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27.
64. See supra note 3.
65. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (5th ed. 1979).
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2. Substantial Compliance
Even if the Kuykendail land was not technically pooled until the
spacing application was approved, it is arguable that Helmerich &
Payne was entitled to an extention of the lease term under the theory
that it substantially complied with the requirements of the lease. The
doctrine of substantial compliance has generally been used when the
failure to perform is a mere technical, nonmaterial variance to the
terms of a contract and when that failure will not result in a detriment
to the other party.68 Applying the doctrine of substantial compliance in
Kuykendall raises two questions: (1) whether the rule applies to oil and
gas leases and (2) whether Helmerich & Payne did substantially com-
ply with the terms of the lease.
In his treatise on oil and gas, Summers states that the substantial
compliance doctrine should apply to oil and gas leases.69 But the Kuy-
kendall court stated that substantial compliance did not apply and that
it had never been used in this type of situations.7 0  However, the
Supreme Court of Oklahoma arguably did apply the principle of sub-
stantial compliance in a situation very similar to Kuykendall when it
decided Petroleum Reserve Corp. v. Dierksen7" in 1981.
68. See Cookson v. Western Oil Fields, Inc., 465 F.2d 460 (10th Cir. 1972). In Cookson, the
court stated the rule for substantial compliance: "When all of the grievances are considered, sepa-
rately and together, they present no more than technical variances from the letter of the contract,
and courts will not deny enforcement in the face of a showing of substantial performance and in
the absence of a detriment." Id at 462; see also Baer Bros. Land & Cattle Co. v. Reed, 197 F.2d
569 (10th Cir. 1952). InBaer the court stated that variances from the contract that are only techni-
cal in nature will not deny the enforcement of a contract if the plaintiff has substantially per-
formed and the other party has not been injured. Id at 573.
69. 4 W. SUMMERS, THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 684, at 166 (1962). Summers also states,
however, that when the time for commencement of drilling is expressly stated in the lease it should
be considered of the essence and substantial compliance will not be an excuse. Id For other cases
holding time to be of the essence in a commencement lease see Niles v. Meade, 189 Ky. 243, -,
224 S.W. 854, 857 (1920) (problems encountered in moving a drilling rig to the drill site did not
excuse the failure to commence drilling on time); Jackson v. Anglin, 252 S.W. 1085, 1087 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1923) (drilling with a derrick that is too small to complete the well is not a commence-
ment of drilling); Rock Creek Oil Corp. v. Wolfe, 35 S.W.2d 1072, 1074 (rex. Civ. App. 1930)
(lessee lost tools in the well which caused the delay).
70. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27. The court stated:
While the "substantial compliance" doctrine has been applied in a situation or two, it
has never been invoked, so far as we can find, in any situation remotely resembling that
[which] we have here-a failure to commence drilling because of a pending application
for pooling. We are convinced that here there was not in fact a substantial compliance
with the lease terms.
Id But see Cookson v. Western Oil Fields, Inc. 465 F.2d 460 (10th Cir. 1972). The Cookson
court stated that the doctrine of substantial performance applies fully to oil and gas leases and
operates to bar recovery for insubstantial or formal breaches. Id at 462.
71. 623 P.2d 602 (Okla. 1981).
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The Petroleum Reserve Corporation leased land from Dierksen
for oil exploration. The primary term of the Dierksen lease was for
three years, provided that drilling was commenced within one year. If
the drilling requirement was not met, the lease would be forfeited un-
less delay rentals were paid.72 The lease also provided that the "[lessee
shall file written unit designations in the county in which the leased
premises are located."7 Petroleum Reserve attempted to satisfy the
commencement of drilling clause by pooling the land and drilling on
neighboring property, however, it failed to file the required unit
designation.74 When Petroleum Reserve failed to make a delay rental
payment on the one year anniversary date, Dierksen claimed the lease
had terminated because the land had not been formally pooled under
the unit designation clause in the lease. The court weighed the equities
surrounding the facts and circumstances of the case and ruled that the
commencement of drilling clause had been satisfied and the lease, by
its terms, was extended past the primary term. The court acknowl-
edged that an express condition in the lease had been breached,
concluding:
The lease language does require filing of unit designation
... .Although we view such a requirement as notice to con-
cerned parties that the land in question has been included in a
specific unit for oil and gas production, there was no evidence
that lessors relied to their detriment on the lack of such a no-
tice, the filing of a written unit designation in the County. We
find that failure to meet that requirement under the facts and
circumstances of this case cannot serve to forfeit the lease."
The facts in Kuykendall indicate that Helmerich & Payne did in-
deed substantially comply with the lease. Helmerich & Payne came
within hours of technically satisfying the terms of the lease by acquir-
ing a pooling order that would have brought the Kuykendall lease
within the existing spacing unit on which it had already commenced
drilling the McClure No. 1 well. The spacing application filed with the
Corporation Commission was approved by the trial examiner on De-
cember 9, 1976, prior to the expiration of the primary term. All that
remained was for the Commission to approve the application.
The one day delay in obtaining the spacing order in no way in-
72. Id at 604.
73. Id
74. The lease was entered into on April 26, 1975, and the well was commenced in October of
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jured Kuykendall. Kuykendall's intention upon entering into the lease
was to determine whether there was oil or gas under the land capable
of being produced in paying quantities. The delay in obtaining the
Commission's formal approval did not affect Kuykendall's intention
because the well which ultimately determined the existence of a reser-
voir was commenced long before the application was approved.76
Since Kuykendall was not injured and since Helmerich & Payne sub-
stantially performed, to declare a forfeiture would be to totally disre-
gard the "gross imbalance of equities."" 7
3. Estoppel
Helmerich & Payne also raised an estoppel defense based on Kuy-
kendall's delay in declaring a forfeiture. In order to apply this defense
two requirements must be met: (1) the lessor must have a legal duty to
notify the lessee of the forefeiture, and (2) the lessee must have been
harmed by the lessor's delay in declaring a forfeiture.78
The appellate court denied the estoppel defense, basing its denial
on the fact that under the terms of the lease Kuykendall did not have a
duty to notify Helmerich & Payne of its forfeiture.79 On this issue the
court is supported by a long line of cases which state that estoppel by
silence will be denied unless notice was required in the lease.80 The
usual rationale is that a lease terminates automatically when a limita-
tion provision of the habendum clause is not met.8 1 A strict application
76. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 26. Helmerich & Payne was not awaiting formal approval of the appli-
cation to commence drilling. In fact, Helmerich & Payne had begun drilling before the applica-
tion was approved, so the final completion date of the well was not affected by the delay.
Kuykendall's motive for executing the lease was to determine whether his land possessed valuable
oil deposits; the well was ultimately drilled, so Kuykendall received the benefit of his bargain.
77. Id at 29. The substantial performance by Helmerich & Payne and the absence of detri-
ment to Kuykendall were factors considered in Justice Bacon's dissent. Id Justice Bacon's dis-
sent also stated, "To hold as the majority holds is to ignore the gross imbalance of equities of
appellant and appellee." Id
78. See id at 28; 3 H. WILLIAMS supra note 51 § 604.7, at 84.1.
79. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 28.
80. But see Eggleson v. McCasland, 98 F. Supp. 693 (E.D. Okla. 1951). In Eggleson the
lessor waited while the lessee expended large sums of money developing the land, knowing the
lessee was not aware of the lessor's intentions to have the lease forfeited. The basis for forfeiture
was a clause in the contract which stated that oil must be produced on the land to continue the
lease past the primary term. The court said the lease was continued because "[p]laintiffs have
been fully aware of the defendant's intentions to expend. . . and yet they have never indicated to
the defendants that they considered this lease to have terminated." Id at 696.
81. The general rule in Oklahoma is that a forfeiture of an oil and gas lease depends on the
facts and circumstances surrounding the case and whether the forfeiture will advance or hinder
justice. There also appears, however, to be a long line of cases stating that a failure to comply
with the express terms of a lease is not a forfeiture but an automatic termination. The cases
1983]
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of the traditional rule that notice is not required would allow a lessor
who intends to enforce a forfeiture clause to stand by while the lessee
spends great sums of money to develop the land; such a showing of bad
faith should not be encouraged by the court. Logic and fairness dictate
that an exception to the no notice rule should be made when only one
of the parties is aware of the termination. Oklahoma recognized this
exception in Strange v. Hicks.82 In Strange the lease provided that the
primary term of two years would be extended "as long thereafter as oil
or gas or either of them is produced from said land. .. -" The lessee
failed to produce oil or gas after the primary term because he was un-
able to find a market. The lessee diligently drilled other wells in the
field with the intention of creating sufficient production to warrant a
pipeline. Knowing the lease had terminated because of the lessee's fail-
ure to produce within the express terms of the lease, the lessor never-
theless stood by and allowed the lessee to further develop the field.
The court held that the lessor's failure to notify the lessee of the forfei-
ture constituted bad faith and consequently refused to recognize the
forfeiture:
We do not believe that the plaintiffs come into court with
clean hands. By acquiescing in the acts of the lessees in the
development of this field and making no claim that the lease
was forfeited but by every act of theirs indicating the lease
was in full force and effect, they obtained an advantage which
they sought to capitalize at the expense of the lessees.84
Kuykendall knew that Helmerich & Payne had applied for a pool-
ing order and had commenced drilling on the adjacent land.85 Instead
of informing them of his intention to deny the extension of the lease,
Kuykendall remained silent and allowed Helmerich & Payne to con-
following the automatic termination theory include Ellison v. Skelly Oil Co., 206 Okla. 496, 498,
244 P.2d 832, 835 (1951) (termination of an oil and gas lease for nonpayment of rent is not a
forfeiture but a termination of the lease in accordance with the terms of the contract); Williams v.
Ware, 167 Okla. 626, 629, 31 P.2d 567, 570 (1934) (failure to pay rental or drill automatically
terminated the lease); Newman v. Klingel, 133 Okla. 286, 288, 272 P. 401, 403 (1928) (failure to
drill or pay rentals made the lease forfeitable at lessor's option); McKinlay v. Feagins, 82 Okla.
193, 194, 198 P. 997, 998 (1921) (failure to commence drilling or pay rent by the date stipulated).
The fact that the lease terminated automatically is also the reason behind not allowing a laches
defense. "Since termination of a lease by operation of the limitation provision of the habendum
clause is automatic, the lessor's delay in bringing suit appears [to be] immaterial. Any defense that
the lessor has waived his right to assert termination of the lease would seem inapplicable." 3 H.
WILLIAMS, supra note 51 § 604.7, at 84.3.
82. 78 Okla. 1, 188 P. 347 (1920).
83. Id at 2, 188 P. at 348.
84. I d at 4, 188 P. at 351.
85. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27.
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tinue drilling. By remaining silent, Kuykendall was arguably attempt-
ing to obtain the benefit of royalties realized from McClure No. 1
without sharing in the risk or expenses of drilling the well. Thus, Kuy-
kendall obtained an advantage which he sought to capitalize at the ex-
pense of Helmerich & Payne.86 The fact remains, however, that even
though Kuykendall may not have acted in good faith, Helmerich &
Payne had ample reason to know that the lease might be terminated.
Helmerich & Payne filed the spacing application with the Corporation
Commission to satisfy the pooling requirement in the lease; it should
have anticipated that a problem would result if approval of the applica-
tion came after the primary term expiration date.
Helmerich & Payne claimed that had it known of Kuykendall's
intent to forfeit the lease it could have attempted to obtain a ratification
of the lease, obtain some equitable apportionment of the risk of drilling
the well, forced a pooling87 or would have at least observed greater
caution in disseminating information about the well.8 8 In short, Hel-
merich & Payne asserted that because Kuykendall remained silent, it
failed to take these preventative measures and as a consequence suf-
fered grave injury. This argument is, however, without merit for noth-
ing prevented Helmerich & Payne from exercising these options before
the lease expired. Perhaps Helmerich & Payne was also "lying behind
the log," 9 hoping that Kuykendall would not notice its technical
breach of the lease. Eventually, Helmerich & Payne's anxiety forced it
to ask the Commission to issue an order nunc pro tunc.90 Where both
parties had the same knowledge about the facts and circumstances, as
in this case, the court was correct in refusing to apply the equitable
doctrine of estoppel.
4. Force Majeure
A force majeure clause in an oil and gas lease provides that the
86. Cf. 78 Okla. at 4, 188 P. at 351 (court found lessors attempting to obtain advantage at
lessee's expense).
87. Forced pooling is "[t]he bringing together, as required by law or a valid order or regula-
tion, of separately owned. . . small tracts sufficient for the granting of a well permit under appli-
cable spacing rules." 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS supra note 4, at 125.
88. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 28.
89. Helmerich & Payne declared Kuykendall was the one "lying behind the log" because
Kuykendall had knowledge of the situation and never offered to help pay for the costs of drilling
McClure No. 1. Id
90. The Corporation Commission issued the spacing order on December 21. 1976, but Hel-
merich & Payne did not ask the Commission to issue an order nunc pro tunc until March 30, 1977,
more than three months later. Id at 26.
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lessee's performance shall be excused if that failure is due to specified
causes.9' A clause in the Kuykendall lease provided that the lease
would not be terminated for failure to comply with its terms "'if com-
pliance is prevented by. . .[any] Law, Order, Rule or Regulation.' "92
Helmerich & Payne claimed that it was precluded from fulfilling the
requirements of the lease because of governmental delays in issuing the
spacing permit which were beyond its control. The court, however,
ruled that the force majeure clause did not apply to this situation since
Helmerich & Payne was not required by any law, order, rule or regula-
tion to locate its well on land which would require Commission ap-
proval for validation of the lease.93 The court noted that Helmerich &
Payne could have drilled on any site; it voluntarily chose not to drill on
the Kuykendall land. The court may have overlooked that within an
existing spacing unit, it is the Corporation Commission that determines
the location of the well site. 94 If the Kuykendall lease was to be pooled
in the existing unit, Helmerich & Payne would not have been free to
drill anywhere on the Kuykendall land. Nevertheless, Helmerich &
Payne possibly could have withdrawn the pending application and
commenced drilling on the Kuykendall property.95 Based on the Cor-
poration Commission's approval of the McClure No. 1 well site, it may
be assumed, however, that to have drilled on the Kuykendall land
would not have resulted in the most efficient development of the reser-
91. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS supra note 4, at 283-84.
92. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 28. The lease does not make it clear whether the parties intended to
make the force majeure clause applicable to voluntary acts done in good faith by the lessee. To
avoid this problem in the future, it is suggested that lease language should make clear the inten-
tions of the parties. California leases generally contain provisions allowing the lessee to develop
the land and not be penalized for any resulting delay. A sample clause from a California lease
reads:
Notwithstanding anything to the contrary herein provided, if any of Lessee's obligations
hereunder conflicts with or violates the provisions of any reasonable conservation pro-
gram or plan of orderly development, whether now or hereafter developed, to which
Lessee may voluntarily subscribe, or of any conservation program or plan which is now
or may hereafter be prescribed by any order of any governmental agency, or of any
schedule of production recommended by any such agency or committee of oil producers,
in accordance with any applicable law, Lessee shall not be obligated to perform such
obligation.
4 H. WILLIAMS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 683.1 n.43 (1980).
93. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 28.
94. "The order establishing such spacing or drilling units shall set forth. . . (4) the location
of the permitted well on each such spacing or drilling unit." OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(c) (Supp.
1982).
95. It would be necessary to withdraw the pending application because Oklahoma law states
that "[t]he drilling of any well or wells into a common source of supply, covered by a pending
spacing application, at a location other than that approved by a special order of the Commission
authorizing the drilling of such well is hereby prohibited." OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp.
1982).
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voir. To have commenced drilling on the Kuykendall land may have
resulted in waste, and waste should not be encouraged by the courts.
96
The appellate court also stated that Helmerich & Payne started too late
to expand its working interest within the section.97 The court then im-
plied that the delay was caused by Helmerich & Payne's untimely filing
of the application rather than the time it took the Commission to pro-
cess it. It is difficult to see what more Helmerich & Payne could have
done to get the required spacing order. The application was made on
November 12, 1976, five days before Helmerich & Payne purchased the
lease from Taft Milford98 and 39 days before the lease was to expire. 99
Helmerich & Payne could reasonably have believed the application
would be approved before the deadline."l° Indeed, it was approved
only hours after the December 20 termination date.
Arguably, if a lessee, in good faith, is prevented from fulfilling the
terms of the lease by delays caused by the Corporation Commission or
another regulatory body, then the force majeure clause should apply.
The key to this argument is good faith. If Helmerich & Payne applied
for a pooling application merely to extend the primary term of the lease
then obviously the clause should not apply. Helmerich & Payne did
not, however, file the application merely to extend the lease, but did so
in furtherance of good business practices with a genuine intent to pro-
duce oil and gas on the pooled land.
5. Due Process
When Taft Milford assigned the lease to Helmerich & Payne it
was subject to a pending spacing application.'' Oklahoma law pro-
vides that unless special approval is granted by the Commission, no
well can be drilled into any common source of supply which is subject
96. Waste would be committed in two ways: (I) economic waste would result from the costs
involved with drilling the unnecessary well on the Kuykendall land, see 8 H. WILLIAMS & C.
MEYERS, supra note 4, at 228; (2) physical waste would result from the loss of oil at the drilling
site, see id at 546.
97. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 28.
98. Helmerich & Payne purchased the lease from Taft Milford on November 17, 1976. Id at
26.
99. The lease was to expire on December 20, 1976. Id
100. The only time requirement is that the application will not be reviewed by the commission
until 15 days after it is filed. This allows the Commission time to notify interested parties. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(a) (Supp. 1982). The 15 day requirement was satisfied since Helmerich &
Payne filed the application about a month before the lease was to expire. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 26.
101. The spacing application was filed on November 12, 1976. OKLA. B.J. at 27. Taft Milford
assigned the lease to Helmerich & Payne on November 17, 1976. Id at 26.
1983]
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to a pending spacing application. 0 2 Helmerich & Payne claimed that
since it could not satisfy the lease by drilling directly on the Kuyken-
dall land due to the pending application, it was thereby denied a prop-
erty right without due process of law.
The due process argument failed for two reasons. First, the statute
allows for exceptions by special approval of the Commission, and sec-
ond, the lease was not forfeited, but rather terminated automatically
upon Helmerich & Payne's failure to commence drilling within the
specified time. The applicable statute dictates that a well cannot be
commenced at a location "other than that approved by a special order
of the Commission."" °3 Since Helmerich & Payne did not elect to ap-
ply for an exception and present its case for drilling directly on the
Kuykendall land, it is difficult to see how it was deprived of due
process.
Additionally, the lease was not forfeited, but instead terminated
automatically.'" A forfeiture is a remedy employed by the courts to
extinguish the life of a lease otherwise in force.' 05 A termination, on
the other hand, occurs at the expiration of the lease by it own terms.'0 6
The court did not rule the lease was forfeited, thereby denying an ex-
isting right in Helmerich & Payne, rather, it merely refused to extend
the lease past the expiration date. The court was correct when it stated,
"[Helmerich & Payne] has been afforded not only substantative due
process but, at every stage of the proceedings, procedural due
process." 07
V. OKLAHOMA LAW AFTER KUYKENDALL
Although the Kuykendall court generally applied current
Oklahoma law, its decision will have a substantial effect on Oklahoma
law because of the limitations it places on the definition of commence-
ment of drilling in mineral leases. The court's strict construction repre-
sents a reversal of the trend to liberally interpret the commencement of
drilling clause to effectuate the intent of the parties and thereby pro-
mote development.
The Kuykendall decision establishes a limit on how far the courts
102. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1(e) (Supp. 1982).
103. Id
104. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 26.
105. 8 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, supra note 4, at 286.
106. Id
107. 54 OKLA. B.J. at 27.
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are willing to go in construing what constitutes commencement of drill-
ing. The court apparently felt that the traditionally liberal interpreta-
tion given to commencement of drilling clauses should not extend to
pooling applications. Although a pooling agreement will satisfy the
commencement or drilling clause for all the leases in a particular unit,
the court was not willing to extend that privilege to leases that were not
pooled by the expiration date stated in the lease. 108 In effect, the court
was saying, "We will go this far but no farther." The apparent inequi-
ties to Helmerich & Payne notwithstanding, to include an application
for spacing within the scope of commencement of drilling was to re-
quire the appellate court to reach too far.
It is difficult to comprehend why the Oklahoma courts should lib-
erally interpret the commencement of drilling clause to effectuate the
intention of the parties and then apply a strict construction to an appli-
cation of pooling such as that filed by Helmerich & Payne. Judging by
their actions, the parties intended to capitalize on the production of
minerals and it should therefore follow that the commencement of
drilling clause should be interpreted to promote that development. It is
indeed the policy of the state of Oklahoma to liberally construe oil and'
gas leases in an effort to promote development. 0 9
Pooling is essential for the efficient development of an oil and gas
108. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 287.9 (1981). For an application of this statute see generally
Whitaker v. Texaco, 283 F.2d 169, 175 (10th Cir. 1960) (concluding that the drilling of Hency No.
I on land that was pooled with a portion of the leased land operated to act with the same effect as
commencing drilling on the leased land in question within the primary term). But see Simpson v.
Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 210 F.2d 640 (10th Cir. 1954). The court stated in regard to OKLA.
STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (1951):
The primary purpose of the Oklahoma statute is to prevent waste and effect conservation
of oil and gas. The objects and purposes of the statute have no relation to the termina-
tion of oil and gas leases or to the continuation of such leases beyond the primary term
by the drilling of wells and the production of oil and gas therefrom. The statute was not
designed to deal with or affect the right of the lessor under an oil and gas lease to cancel
it for nondevelopment, nor the right of the lessee to extend the lease beyond the primary
term by the drilling of a well and the production of oil and gas therefrom.
210 F.2d at 642. See also Gilmer Oil Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 177 Okla. 505, 506, 61 P.2d 22,
24 (1936) (the primary intent of the Oklahoma statutes regulating oil and gas production is for the
conservation of oil and gas).
109. Oklahoma has long held that leases are to be construed to promote development. This
principle has been applied in a number of different circumstances. See Marland Oil Co. v. Hub-
bard, 168 Okla. 518, 519, 34 P.2d 278, 279 (1934) (damage for oil, salt, water and refuse running
from leased land on to another); Berton v. Coss, 139 Okla. 42, 46, 280 P. 1093, 1096 (1929) (failure
to develop in a reasonable time when there was no express development clause in the contract);
Chi-Okla. Oil & Gas Co. v. Shertzer, 105 Okla. 111, 115, 231 P. 877, 880 (1924) (construing a pay
renewal money or commence drilling clause); Garfield Oil Co. v. Champlin, 78 Okla. 91, 92, 189
P. 514, 515 (1920) (construing a pay or commence drilling clause); Curtis v. Harris, 76 Okla. 226,
226, 184 P. 574, 575 (1919) (construing a pay or commence drilling clause); New State Oil & Gas
Co. v. Dunn, 75 Okla. 141, 142, 182 P. 514, 515 (1919) (construing a complete a well or pay rental
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reservoir. Unnecessary drilling is wasteful because of the high cost of
drilling additional wells and the loss from dissipation of otherwise pro-
ducible hydrocarbons.' 10 These lost hydrocarbons and increased pro-
duction costs would eventually lead to higher prices for the consumer.
Other Lessees faced with decisions similar to those faced by Helmerich
& Payne will now be forced to commence drilling on the leased land or
in the alternative, to assume the risk that the application will not be
approved in time." ' I The court is hardly promoting the development of
mineral interests by forcing the lessee to make decisions that go against
sound business practices."12
VI. CONCLUSION
The appellate court's decision not only ignores the gross imbalance
of equities between Helmerich & Payne and Kuykendall, it also creates
needless hardship and uncertainty for both lessees and lessors. Lessees
will be forced to gamble on whether the Corporation Commission will
approve their pending spacing applications before their leases expire."13
Lessors may lose potential royalty income if their lessees are reluctant
to develop the land by the formation or extention of a spacing unit
during the last few months of the primary term.
h A policy of promoting development would have best been served
had the court held that Helmerich & Payne's commencement of Mc-
Clure No. 1, combined with its filing of an application to extend the
spacing unit, satisfied the commencement of drilling clause in the Kuy-
kendall lease. The effect of such a holding would have been to en-
courage Oklahoma lessees to aggressively develop the state's minerals,
to the benefit of lessees and lessors alike. After Kuykendall, however,
the lessee's interest and investment is contingent on the approval of the
Corporation Commission." 4
clause); Paraffine Oil Co. v. Cruce, 63 Okla. 95, 98, 162 P. 716, 718-19 (1916) (construing a condi-
tion precedent that one well must be proved productive before additional wells are drilled).
110. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 87.1 (Supp. 1982).
111. It is conceivable that a contested pooling application could be in court for a long period
of time. The lessee would then have to decide whether to wait until the court renders a decision or
to proceed with the drilling of an unnecessary well just to satisfy the commencement of drilling
clause in the lease.
112. Forcing lessees in Helmerich & Payne's position to commence drilling on the leased land
instead of pooling would tend to promote the development of the land, but it would not be an
efficient development. It would be more practical to assume the rule means to promote the effi-
cient development of land.
113. See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
114. If the Corporation Commission does not ultimately approve the application then the
lease will terminate and revert back to the lessor.
[Vol. 19:271
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Helmerich & Payne filed its pooling application with the good
faith intention of commencing a well on pooled acreage and thus at-
tempted to satisfy its obligation to develop under the lease. On the
other hand, Kuykendall obtained more than he bargained for, a royalty
interest in a producing well, undiminished by the lease interest thereto-
fore held by Helmerich & Payne. It is the opinion of this author, based
on the imbalance of equities, that the Oklahoma Court of Appeals
reached an unnecessarily harsh decision. 1 5 The appellate court has
apparently departed from the long line of Oklahoma cases that liber-
ally interpret commencement of drilling clauses to promote develop-
ment in this state. Some outer limit must exist beyond which a court is
justified in finding that commencement has not begun, but the appel-
late court was in error in drawing the line in this instance.
John Decker
115. To avoid the harsh results of this decision there are several things lessees in Helmerich &
Payne's position can do to improve their chances of extending the lease beyond the primary term:
I) be sure the force majeure clause in the lease allows the lessee to develop the land, complying
voluntarily with any reasonable conservation program and yet insulates the lessee from any conse-
quences resulting from delay, see supra note 92; 2) approach the lessor and obtain a written agree-
ment to extend the primary term before the filing of the spacing application; and 3) apply for a
drilling permit and begin preparing the leased land for drilling with the intention of completing
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